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INTRODUCTION 
The protection of the EU’s financial interests and the fight against fraud are areas in which 
responsibility is shared between the European Union and the Member States. Each year the 
Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, produces a report presenting statistics 
and the new measures they have taken to meet their obligations in this field, in accordance 
with Article 325 (5) TFEU. The report is sent to the European Parliament and the Council and 
is published
1. This year’s report also analyses two special topics that the Commission and the 
Member States have agreed to present in the 2009 report and to which Member States have 
contributed via a questionnaire
2. These topics are ‘Cooperation between the Commission and 
the Member States concerning on-the-spot checks’ and ‘Measures taken by the Member 
States for the recovery of irregular amounts’. Both topics are of particular relevance for the 
EU institutions
3 as well as to the national competent authorities. 
The first part gives a summary of the statistics on irregularities reported by the Member 
States in those areas where Member States implement the budget (agricultural policy, 
cohesion policy and pre-accession funds, i.e. around 80 % of the budget) and for the collection 
of the EU’s traditional own resources. It also gives an estimate of irregularities in the field of 
expenditure managed directly by the Commission and an overview of the operational 
activities of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). The statistics must be read and used 
with great care: a reported irregularity is not in most cases a possible fraud (which is a 
deliberate act). A reported suspicion of fraud is not necessarily a fraud confirmed by a court 
judgment. All the irregularities presented are being dealt with and are subject to different 
forms of follow-up, as described in parts 1 and 5. 
The  second part focuses on the international dimension of the protection of the EU’s 
financial interests and presents the state of ratification of the protection of financial interests 
(PFI) instruments.  
In part 3 the report deals with administrative measures taken by the Commission to fight 
fraud and irregularities in the customs area. 
Part 4 gives an overview of the results of the questionnaire regarding cooperation between 
the Commission (OLAF) and the Member States concerning on-the-spot checks
4.  
The final part of the report deals with recoveries made in 2009 in all budget areas and 
presents the measures that Member States take for securing the recovery of irregular amounts. 
The report is accompanied by two Commission working papers
5. 
                                                 
1  Previous years’ reports: http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/reports/anti-fraud_en.html. 
2  The complete results of the questionnaire are presented in the document ‘Implementation of Article 325 
TFEU in 2009 by the Member States’ (Accompanying document 1 to this report). 
3  See also the Resolution of the European Parliament of 24 April 2009 on the protection of the 
Communities’ financial interests and the fight against fraud — Annual report 2007 (2008/2242(INI)). 
4  See Accompanying document 1 ‘Implementation of Article 325 TFEU in 2009 by the Member States.  
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1.  RESULTS OF THE FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD: STATISTICS ON FRAUD AND OTHER 
IRREGULARITIES 
1.1.  Statistics on fraud and other irregularities reported by the Member States and 
Commission departments in 2009 
In the fields where Member States implement the budget and for the collection of the EU’s 
own resources, EU legislation requires the Member States to report suspicions of fraud and 
other detected irregularities affecting the EU’s financial interests.  
Distinguishing between fraud and other irregularities is important. An irregularity is any 
infringement of an EU provision by an economic operator which has, or would have, the 
effect of prejudicing the EU’s financial interests
6. Fraud is an irregularity committed 
intentionally which constitutes a criminal offence
7. The Member States must identify 
whichever irregularities constitute suspected fraud. The real financial impact of fraud can be 
measured only at the end of legal proceedings. 
The Commission working paper Statistical evaluation of irregularities
8 presents an in-depth 
analysis of the information reported by the Member States and includes statistics on fraud and 
other irregularities detected by Commission departments in the areas of the budget under 
centralised direct management. 
                                                                                                                                                         
5  For references, see cover page of the report. 
6  Article 1(2) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection 
of the European Communities’ financial interests (OJ L 312, 23.12.1995). 
7  Article 1(1)(a) of the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the financial interests of the 
European Communities (OJ C 316, 27.11.1995). 
8 Second  Accompanying  document to this report.  
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Table 1: Number of irregularities and amounts — 2009 
Number of irregularities 
reported 
Total estimated financial 
impact of irregularities, 
including suspected fraud (€ 
million) 
Estimated financial impact of 
suspected fraud only (€ 
million) 
Area 
2008
9 2009  2008
10  2009 2008 2009 
Agriculture  1 133  1 621  102.3 (0.24 % 
of allocations) 
125 ( 0.24 % 
of allocations) 
4 (0.01 % of 
allocations) 
13.3 (0.03% of 
allocations 
Cohesion 
Policy 
4 007  4 931  585.2 (~0.11 % 
of allocations) 
1 223 (2.53% 
of allocations) 
57 (~0.11 % of 
allocations) 
109 (~0.23 % 
of allocations) 
Pre-accession 
funds 
523 706  61(~0.9 % of 
allocations) 
 
117 (~ % 0.78 
of allocations 
13 (~0.9 ~% of 
allocations) 
 
57 (0.38~% of 
allocations) 
 
Direct 
expenditure 
932 705  34.7  (~0.17 % 
of allocations) 
 
27.5 (~0.17 % 
of allocations) 
 
3.2 (~0.02 % 
of allocations) 
 
1.5 (~ 0.01 % 
of allocations) 
 
Total 
expenditure 
6 595 7  963  783.2(~  0.07 % 
of the 
expenditure in 
the four areas) 
1.492.5 
(1.13% of the 
total 
expenditure in 
the four areas) 
77.2 (~ 0.07 % 
of the 
expenditure in 
the four areas) 
180.8 (0.13 % 
of the 
expenditure in 
the four areas) 
Own 
resources
11 
6 075  4 648  375 (~0.46 % 
of the total 
amount of own 
resources)
12) 
343 (~0. 23 % 
of the total 
amount of own 
resources) 
75 (~0.46 % of 
the total 
amount of own 
resources) 
99 (~0.68% of 
the total 
amount of own 
resources) 
1.2.  Revenues 
1.2.1.  Traditional own resources (TOR) 
The number of cases of irregularities reported in 2009 was 23 % lower than in 2008 (4 648 
cases in 2009, compared with 6 075 in 2008), while the estimated amount is also 8.5 % lower 
(from € 375 million in 2008 to € 343 million in 2009). The number of communications from 
the ten new Member States showed continued growth since their accession in 2004 until 2007. 
In 2008 the growth stopped and 2009 shows 2 % less communicated cases compared with 
2008 although the amount of TOR increased by 20 % from 2008 to 2009.  
Suspected fraud accounted for approximately 19 % of cases of irregularities reported, with an 
estimated financial impact of approximately € 99 million.  
                                                 
9  The figures have been updated for certain sectors since the 2008 report. 
10 Idem. 
11  Customs duties and agricultural levies. 
12  This percentage is based on an estimate of traditional own resources in the 2009 general budget, and not 
on accounts.  
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The methods of detection of irregularities vary between Member States; however, in 2009 the 
vast majority of cases (75 %) were detected by means of either primary national inspections or 
post-clearance control audits. A large group of Member States
13 mostly use ‘ex-post controls’ 
to detect irregularities. Primary inspections are used in particular in Denmark, Slovenia, 
Romania, Malta and Greece.  
Chart 1 illustrates by which methods OWNRES
14 cases — in amounts — have been 
discovered by the Member States in 2009. For reasons of presentation the following methods 
are included in the term ‘ex-post controls’: audit of the accounts, Commission inspections, 
inspections by anti-fraud services, inspection visits, national post-clearance audits and tax 
audits.  
 
Chart 1: Detection of irregularities in 2009 — methods 
The goods involved in irregularities and frauds demanding Member States’ attention are very 
diverse. TVs and monitors, clothing and of course tobacco keep their relevance in 2009 and 
like in previous years are the most important goods involved in registered cases of irregularity 
or fraud. The origin of the goods concerned is likewise varied, although some countries 
remain continuously at the top of the rankings (China, the United States, Japan). 
                                                 
13  BG, CY, AT, SE, HU, SK, BE, EE, LT, DE, ES, PT, FR, IE, UK. 
14  OWNRES is an abbreviation for own resources; the OWNRES database is a key tool for obtaining data 
for global analysis of fraud and irregularities affecting traditional own resources.  
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1.3.  Expenditure — overall analysis 
The report analyses four main headings on the expenditure side of the EU budget: 
Agriculture, Cohesion policy, Pre-accession assistance and Direct expenditure, covering 
different policies ranging from research and development to humanitarian aid. 
1 621
706
705
8% 8%
2%
N° of irregularities
4 931
Irregular amounts
82%
Agriculture Cohesion Policy Pre-Accession Direct expenditure
 
Chart 2: Proportion of the above-mentioned four budget areas in terms of reported 
irregularities and suspicions of fraud (inner circle) and the related financial amounts 
(outer circle) in 2009. 
The Cohesion Policy and Pre-Accession Assistance present a share of the irregularities that 
exceeds by far their share of resources on the overall budget, showing that they remain sectors 
were the management and control systems need further improvements. 
In general, for what concerns the reporting of irregularities for the expenditure part of the EU 
budget, 2009 should be regarded as a transition year due to the introduction of the internet 
based reporting system (IMS- Irregularity Management System) which may have caused 
problems in relation to the reporting, registration and migration of irregularities into the new 
system. However, the new reporting system has improved the overall conditions for 
irregularity reporting. It is therefore welcomed by the majority of the Member States which 
have already used it for the 2009 reporting year. All Member States should fully implement 
the IMS and be ready to use the system for the 2010 reporting exercise.  
1.3.1.  Agricultural expenditure 
In 2009, Member States reported 1 621 new cases with a total amount affected of about € 125 
million. An increase of 43 % of reported cases is registered in comparison to 2008, as well as 
an increase of 23 % in the irregular amounts reported. A reason for this increase is the entry 
into operation of IMS, which allowed far more users to process communications, thus having  
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a direct impact on the number of cases reported. Spain reported the highest number of cases 
(404) and Italy reported the highest amounts affected (€ 54 million).  
Compliance by Member States has improved with the introduction of the new internet-based 
reporting system, although some attention still needs to be paid to issues such as timely 
reporting, personal data and measures affected.  
Therefore, the Commission calls upon Member States to further improve compliance with 
special reference to the latter issues, by using the newly introduced internet reporting system. 
For expenditure from the financial years 2006-09, Member States have reported so far 2 086 
cases of irregularities, with a total affected amount of € 97 million. The highest number of 
cases was reported by Spain (377) and the highest amounts affected by irregularities were 
reported by Italy (€ 14 million). The highest expenditure was made by France (20 %), while 
the number of irregularity cases (127) and the corresponding amounts affected by 
irregularities (€ 9 million, representing 0.09 % of expenditure) communicated by France 
remain rather low compared to the expenditure. For the same financial years, Member States 
have communicated 288 cases of suspected fraud, with a total amount affected of € 12 million.  
Sectors with a rather high irregularity rate are ‘sugar’, ‘pig meat, eggs and poultry’, ‘cereals’, 
‘rural development’ and ‘fruits and vegetables’. These figures should be considered as a half-
time result, as cases of irregularities concerning the 2006-2009 expenditure will continue to 
be reported in the coming years. 
Definitive figures can only be determined for years that can be considered as ‘finalised’. The 
financial year 2004 is the latest financial year to be considered as finalised. Audit plans have 
been executed, recovery procedures have been started and irregularities have been reported. 
The total expenditure for 2004 was about € 43 billion. Member States reported in total 2 216 
cases with a total amount affected of about € 99 million. This implies an irregularity rate of 
0.23 %.  
Chart 3 provides an overview of the irregularity rates per Member State
15 in 2004. The 
irregularity rate varies considerably between the Member States. This may be an indication of 
the effectiveness of the control systems in place and it is a question that will necessitate 
further monitoring. Member States classified 37 cases as suspected fraud, of which 23 cases 
(62 %) were reported by Italy. 
                                                 
15  CY and MT are not indicated on the map, the reason being that they had no expenditure for this sector 
in 2004.  
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Chart 3: Irregularity rate per Member State-EU-25, in 2004  
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1.3.2.  Cohesion Policy 
In 2009, 4 931 irregularities were reported, involving an overall amount of € 1.22 billion. 
Reported irregularities and related financial amounts have been increasing in relation to 2008. 
The increase has been significant in terms of both number of reported irregularities (+23 %) 
and irregular amounts (+109 %). A number of factors could explain these increases: reported 
irregularities concern three different programming periods (1994-99, 2000-06 and 2007-13); 
Romania and Bulgaria have both reported irregularities; the closure of the 2000-06 
programming period is approaching and there is an increase in checks and audits linked to this 
event. 
In particular, the last argument seems the most pertinent, considering also that a similar 
situation has been encountered (and with even higher differences in relation to the previous 
year) for the closure of the 1994-99 programming period. 
However, given the multi-annual nature of the programmes run under the cohesion policy, the 
analysis by programming period provides more interesting indications than an analysis based 
on yearly budgets. 
Throughout the 2000-06 programming period, which is approaching its closure (2010), the 
overall irregularity rate is almost 1.6 %, while the fraud rate is about 0.25 %. These rates 
exclusively represent the estimated impact on the payments from the Commission to the 
Member States of, respectively, irregularities (including suspected and established fraud) and 
suspected fraud (alone). In both cases, therefore, these rates fail to indicate what the real 
dimension of irregularities and fraud is. These rates represent the results of the checks and 
audits by national competent authorities and no extrapolation is allowed unless the size of the 
audited and checked sample is known. 
The highest irregularity rates concern the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
16 
and Objective 2 programmes (aimed at revitalising areas facing structural difficulties). For the 
ERDF the most plausible explanation is that this fund finances projects of a higher value and 
therefore irregularities tend also to involve a greater amount. For the Objective 2 programmes, 
the very high irregularity rates of the UK and the Netherlands, which mainly benefit from this 
type of programmes, may have influenced the overall rate. 
In terms of suspected fraud rate, the ERDF remains the most affected fund (0.29 %). 
Objective 1 programmes (supporting developments in less prosperous regions) present the 
highest rate (0.30 %), followed by Objective 3 programmes (which support the adaptation and 
modernisation of education, training and employment policies and systems in non-Objective 1 
regions) with 0.17 %
17.  
                                                 
16  The ERDF finances direct aid to investments in companies (in particular SMEs) to create sustainable 
jobs; infrastructure projects linked notably to research and innovation, telecommunications, the 
environment, energy and transport; financial instruments (capital risk funds, local development funds, 
etc.) to support regional and local development and to foster cooperation between towns and regions; 
technical assistance measures. 
17  Given the fact that regions benefiting from the Objective 1 programmes are the less prosperous regions 
and those benefiting from Objective 3 programmes are the richest, need and greed seem the principal 
drivers behind fraud.   
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Italy, Poland, Estonia and Slovakia present the highest suspected fraud rates among Member 
States as shown in Chart 4: 
 
Chart 4: Fraud rate per Member State (EU-25) for the 2000-06 programming period 
However, higher suspected fraud rates may not necessarily mean that more fraudulent activity 
affecting the EU’s financial interests is taking place in certain Member States. It is rather an 
indication that the anti-fraud systems in place are performing well (capable of detecting fraud 
and willing to report it), which always produces higher results. The Commission will further 
monitor these results and analyse the relationship between the anti-fraud systems in place and 
the suspected fraud rates reported. 
Among the Member States with very low suspected fraud rates Spain and France stand out 
(especially in relation to their size and to the financial support received). In particular, those 
results could indicate either a lower fraud detection capability or the fact that a proportion of 
any detected fraud remains unreported.  
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Finally, data related to the Cohesion Fund remain too fragmented to provide a reliable picture. 
The Commission is working on the full deployment of IMS also for the Cohesion Fund and 
this is expected to improve the situation in the coming years. Member States
18 which have not 
yet introduced the new reporting system are invited to deploy all the necessary efforts for its 
implementation.  
In order to simplify the irregularity reporting process, on 1 September 2009 Commission 
Regulation (EC) No. 1828/2006
19 was amended
20. The main objectives of the amendments 
introduced were to clarify the existing provisions based on the experience gained by the 
Commission and the Member States with regard to the application of Regulation (EC) No. 
1681/94 concerning irregularities and the recovery of sums wrongly paid in connection with 
the financing of the structural policies and the organisation of an information system in this 
field
21, by making the reporting easier while ensuring that important data for risk analysis are 
not lost, and to align reporting provisions concerning structural funds to a large extent with 
the provisions applicable to the agricultural sector.  
1.3.3.  Pre-accession funds  
In 2009, 706 newly detected irregular cases with an affected amount of € 117 million were 
reported by the national authorities in 14 reporting countries. An increase of 35 % in the 
number of cases is recorded. It demonstrates that detections in the area of pre-accession 
assistance are not phasing out but rather shifting towards a smaller group of countries, i.e. 
EU–2 and candidate countries. Bulgarian and Romanian irregularities together make up 81 % 
of cases and 93 % of irregular amounts reported in 2009. Yet, the rising tendency is only 
applicable to Bulgaria, with an increase of 134 % in cases. Consequently, the trends are highly 
influenced by their reporting patterns and thus the focus of analysis is narrowed down. 
The EU amounts affected keep rising and thus accumulate with reference to the whole 
programming period, while allocations remain fixed and payments are gradually declining. As 
a consequence irregularity and suspected fraud rates show a rising trend. 
Five Member States (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia) and Turkey reported 
suspected fraud cases in 2009. The number of cases of suspected fraud was 262, with a 
financial impact of € 57 million.  
The highest number of suspected fraud cases was reported by Bulgaria. Suspected fraud cases 
detected for the SAPARD
22 fund clearly dominate the picture. They make up 67 % of all the 
cases from this country. In fact, Bulgarian SAPARD cases account for 92 % of all SAPARD 
suspected fraud in 2009 reported to OLAF. Bulgarian authorities were requested by the 
Commission to enhance control systems and carry out additional checks and this is reflected 
in the rising figures of detected and reported suspected fraud cases. The drastically rising 
share of suspected fraud is expected to decline following the finalisation of judicial 
procedures and communication of updated reports in the coming years. 
                                                 
18  Spain and France did not use the IMS in 2009 and Sweden and Ireland have still to fully implement it. 
19  OJ L 371, 27.12.2006. 
20  OJ L 250, 23.9.2009. 
21  OJ L 172, 7.7.1994. 
22  This programme has supported agricultural and rural development in candidate countries.  
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The total suspected fraud rate for the whole programming period of SAPARD is at the level 
of 2.8 %. The Bulgarian fraud rate for SAPARD is 20 %, while the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia and Slovakia have a zero fraud rate which puts, for instance, in question the reliability 
of the reported information or the fraud detection capability in the SAPARD sector.  
Chart 5 shows the fraud rate for SAPARD by country. 
 
Chart 5: suspected fraud rate for SAPARD programme per Member State and per 
Candidate Country in 2009. 
Controls seem to be well spread. Control of documents and audit are the most frequently 
applied methods of detecting irregularities in 2009. The majority of suspected fraud cases in 
Bulgaria were detected by audit. The exceptional situation in Bulgaria points to some 
weaknesses in the national anti-fraud system.  
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The Member States and Candidate countries are invited to report irregularities via the new 
Pre-accession Assistance Module of IMS as soon as this module becomes operational
23.  
1.3.4.  Statistics on expenditure directly managed by the Commission 
This year’s analysis of irregularities in this area was based on data held in the Commission’s 
accounting system ABAC, which is a transverse, transactional information system allowing 
all budgetary and accounting operations to be executed and monitored by the Commission. 
One of the functionalities of the ABAC system is the ‘recovery context’, which gathers 
detailed information on recovery orders issued by the Commission departments and registered 
in ABAC. The recovery context is a relatively new functionality within the system. The 
collection of data from the Commission departments only started recently and the current data 
available in ABAC refer to recovery orders issued since 2008. The data presented should 
therefore be treated with particular caution and not as empirical evidence of the level of fraud 
and irregularity. 
The number of recovery orders relating to cases of irregularities and suspected fraud in this 
area came to 705, with a presumed financial impact of € 27.5 million, € 1.5 million of which 
was accounted for by 15 reported cases of suspected fraud. Irregularities in the sector of 
external action accounted for € 4.4 million and in the area of internal policies for € 23.1 
million.  
1.4.  Statistics on OLAF’s activities 
Once a preliminary evaluation has been made of information received, OLAF may open any 
of five types of cases: an internal investigation, an external investigation, a coordination case, 
a criminal assistance case or a mutual assistance case. The number of cases opened each year 
is stable (220 in 2009, 204 in 2008 and 201 in 2007). Since 2004, the number of 
investigations opened by OLAF on its own initiative (internal and external investigations) has 
equalled then exceeded the number opened by OLAF to provide assistance and coordination 
to national authorities (coordination cases and criminal assistance cases). Since 2005, OLAF’s 
own-initiative investigations have accounted for around 75 % of all cases opened. The number 
of active cases has increased (455 at the end of 2009, compared with 425 at the end of 2008). 
The table below provides a snapshot of the situation at the end of 2009. The slight increase in 
the number of active investigations as compared to 2008 is partially due to the introduction of 
a de minimis policy, whereby OLAF is focussing its operational resources on more complex 
fraud cases which by their nature require longer periods of investigation. 
                                                 
23  Once the module becomes fully operational it will manifest a number of advantages like improved 
compliance, less technical nature mistakes, possibility for reporting authorities at different levels to 
access information on all the (open) irregularities already reported.  
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Table 2: Cases ongoing as at 31 December 2009 by sector, and their financial impact 
Sector  Cases under active investigation 
31 December 2009 
Financial impact from investigation (€ 
million) 
Agriculture  79  106.48 
Cigarettes  32  65.31 
Customs  36  245.23 
Direct expenditure  47  65,41 
EU institutions and 
bodies 
133  25.07 
External Aid  86  153.31 
Structural funds  43  658.19 
Trade  1  0.29 
Total  457  1319.29 
For more details and a comparison with previous years, see the OLAF report.
24
                                                 
24 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/anti_fraud/reports/index_en.html.  
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2.  THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE PROTECTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S 
FINANCIAL INTERESTS  
The protection of financial interests and the fight against fraud and corruption are tasks for the 
European Union that go beyond its borders and need therefore to be reflected in the 
international agreements that the Union is concluding with third countries or in the 
multilateral conventions to which it becomes a party.  
To effectively combat fraud, corruption, smuggling of cigarettes and other illegal activities 
detrimental to its financial interests, the EU on its behalf and on behalf of the Member States 
is negotiating anti-fraud agreements with third countries and takes part in multilateral 
agreements or conventions.  
2.1.  Anti-corruption multilateral agreements  
The European Commission on behalf of the European Union negotiated the conditions for the 
implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) at the 3rd 
Conference of the States Parties. Alongside Member States, the European Union is a ‘state 
party’ to the Convention within its area of competence (prevention measures in the public and 
private sectors, such as the establishment of anti-corruption bodies, and transparency and 
accountability in matters of public finance, effective asset recovery and international 
cooperation). Parties are required — inter alia — to take measures which will support the 
tracing, freezing, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of corruption. The Conference also 
adopted the terms of reference of the review mechanism for the Convention. It will require the 
European Union to assess its compliance with the standards of the UNCAC and prepare itself 
for the review in the coming years. 
The Commission also takes part in the activities of the European anti-corruption network, 
which was created by the Council in 2008
25. It was formally established in November 2009 at 
a meeting of the European Partners against Corruption (EPAC) in Slovenia, where the rules of 
procedure were adopted and the management bodies set up. The Commission (OLAF) is a 
formal member of EPAC.  
2.2.  Negotiation of bilateral anti-fraud agreements 
In the context of the reinforced commitment of the EU and the G-20 to establish a high level 
of international cooperation with the financial centres and tax havens in third countries which 
match the OECD standards on tax cooperation, and following the Ecofin Council meeting of 
February 2009, the Commission amended its proposal, adopted on 10 December 2008, for a 
Council Decision on the signing and on the conclusion of a cooperation agreement between 
the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Principality of 
Liechtenstein, of the other part, to combat fraud and any other illegal activity to the detriment 
of their financial interests.  
                                                 
25  Council Decision 2008/852/JHA of 24 October 2008 on a contact-point network against corruption (OJ 
L 301, 12.11.2008).  
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The amended proposals
26 were adopted in November 2009 and take on board the recent 
standards for provisions on exchange of information in the field of taxation and the changes 
imposed by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.  
This agreement would bring considerable added value in so far as its scope covers not only 
tax evasion, tax fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the 
parties, but also the exchange of information on tax matters, in line with the OECD standard, 
thereby preventing banking secrecy being relied on as an exception that would prevent 
information exchange. The agreement contains provisions on administrative assistance, in 
particular on assistance on request (requests for information, for surveillance and for 
investigations) and on special forms of cooperation and recovery. However, it also allows for 
mutual legal assistance in all matters of tax offences. 
This agreement is of the utmost importance as it should also serve as a model for anti-fraud 
agreements with other third countries (Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and the Swiss 
Confederation), along the lines of the recommendation adopted by the Commission in June 
2009. The agreement should therefore be signed without delay and the Council should give its 
approval. 
2.3.  Negotiation of anti-fraud provisions to be included in Association Agreements 
(AAs) and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) 
In line with its enhanced European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Commission 
is currently conducting negotiations for a new, comprehensive agreement with Ukraine, a 
priority partner country within the ENP. Relations between the EU and Ukraine have since 
1998 been based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which provides a 
comprehensive framework for cooperation between the two parties.  
At the Paris Summit between the EU and Ukraine in September 2008, an agreement was 
reached to start negotiations on an EU and Ukraine Association Agreement (AA), which is to 
be the successor agreement to the PCA. The AA should renew the EU-Ukraine common 
institutional framework, facilitating the deepening of relations in all areas, including the 
protection of the EU’s financial interests and the fight against fraud and corruption affecting 
EU funds. 
The provisions in the financial cooperation chapter negotiated with the Ukrainian counterparts 
represent the most comprehensive and broadest set of anti-fraud and control provisions in 
relation to the Commission’s competences in this area. The chapter consists of a wide range 
of stipulations regarding the exchange of information and further cooperation at operational 
level, the prevention of irregularities, fraud and corruption, the communication of 
irregularities, on-the-spot checks, administrative measures and penalties, etc.  
The Commission, through OLAF, is currently leading several PCA and AA negotiation 
processes
27 with respect to financial cooperation and protection of the EU’s and its partner 
countries’ financial interests. The financial cooperation chapter within the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement could be used as a solid basis for future negotiations.  
                                                 
26  COM(2009) 644 final, 23.11.2009 and COM(2009) 648 final, 2.12.2009. 
27  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Brunei, China, Georgia, Iraq, Libya, Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, Philippines, 
Russia, Ukraine and Vietnam.  
EN  19     EN 
2.4.  Fight against international illicit tobacco traffic  
Illicit trade in tobacco products is a criminal activity with a number of particularly harmful 
aspects. The Commission, through OLAF, not only assists and supports law enforcement 
authorities throughout the EU with their operational cases, but also coordinates major tax and 
criminal investigations with the Member States and third countries. OLAF organises and 
coordinates Europe-wide and world-wide customs operations to target specific problems, such 
as Operation Diabolo in 2007 (aimed at intercepting counterfeit products from China which 
are smuggled in shipping containers to the EU); Operation Mudan in 2008 (to address the 
growing problem of smuggling of cigarettes by post), and Diabolo II (which had the same 
objective as the first Operation Diabolo) in September 2009.  
In 2009, the Commission continued to play a leading role in the negotiations on a protocol to 
eliminate illicit trade in tobacco products. This protocol is based on the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, an international treaty with currently 168 parties. The 
Commission (represented by OLAF and DG SANCO) has worked closely, and effectively, 
with the Member States and the Council, in the context of the Working Party on Customs 
Union (Legislation and Policy) to coordinate the position of the EU for these 
intergovernmental negotiations. Central to this coordinated position is the provision of 
Article 7 (Tracking and tracing). The Commission views this particular provision as being the 
core of the Protocol and an essential instrument in the fight against the illicit trade. 
The Commission invites Member States to continue joint efforts to make these negotiations a 
success. 
2.5.  Ratification process for protection of financial interests (PFI) instruments 
The second Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ 
Financial Interests
28, which contains in particular provisions on liability of legal persons, 
confiscation and money laundering, entered into force on 19 May 2009, after the Member 
States concerned notified their ratification
29. 
Hungary ratified the Convention and its protocols
30 on 18 January 2010, with a single 
declaration with regard to the protocol on the interpretation of the Convention by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). Estonia has yet to ratify this latter protocol. The Czech 
Republic and Malta remain the only Member States that have not yet ratified either the 
Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests or its 
protocols. With regard to the follow-up of the second report on the implementation by the 
Member States of these instruments
31, the Commission has engaged in further analysis on the 
conformity of national provisions, in particular as regards Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg. 
                                                 
28  OJ C 316, 27.11.1995. 
29  See also Communication from the Commission on the entry into force on 19 May 2009 of the second 
PFI protocol, OJ C 219, 12.9.2009. 
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The Member States are invited to proceed with the ratification of these legal instruments 
without delay.  
3.  OTHER OPERATIONAL SUPPORT MEASURES TAKEN BY THE COMMISSION IN 2009: 
PROGRESS IN THE CUSTOMS AREA  
Further progress was achieved in 2009 in the customs area, with the deployment, in 
accordance with the new Regulation 766/2008
32, of a new customs database and the joint 
customs operation Diabolo II.  
3.1.  The joint customs operation Diabolo II 
This joint customs operation led to the seizure of more than 65 million counterfeit cigarettes 
and 369 000 other counterfeit items (shoes, toys, cameras, headphones, hats, caps, gloves, 
handbags, etc.) representing over 20 different trademarks. It also resulted in further 
international investigations into criminal activities. The operation, coordinated by the 
European Commission through the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), was named 
‘Diabolo II’ following the successful 2007 joint customs operation ‘Diabolo I’.  
The success of this joint operation highlights the importance of maintaining close cooperation 
among all partners to combat the global trade in counterfeit goods and to protect legitimate 
trade in genuine products. This operation is an excellent model for future operational 
cooperation, built on confidence and trust, involving all ASEM (Asia–Europe meeting)
33 
partners. 
ASEM, with its 45 European and Asian members, again proved an effective platform for 
cooperation among customs administrations. Diabolo II targeted the smuggling of counterfeit 
cigarettes and other counterfeit goods within the framework of ASEM. The operation took 
place in September/October 2009, coordinated by OLAF with the support of Europol and 
Interpol.  
The operation’s success is due to cooperation and effective work involving customs officials 
from 13 Asian countries and 27 EU Member States and constitutes an encouragement for the 
conduct of further common operations.  
3.2.  Deployment of improved databases — Customs Files Identification Database 
(FIDE) 
The objective of FIDE (a new database used by the Member States’ customs authorities) is to 
help prevent operations in breach of customs and agricultural legislation applicable to goods 
entering or leaving the customs territory of the EU and to facilitate and accelerate their 
detection and prosecution. A decision was adopted by the Council on 30 November 2009, 
replacing the CIS Convention and its FIDE protocol
34. 
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FIDE enables the national authorities responsible for carrying out customs investigations 
when opening a file on or investigating one or more persons or businesses to identify 
competent authorities of other Member States which are investigating or have investigated 
those persons or businesses in order to coordinate their investigations. FIDE acts as a registry 
of persons or companies subject to investigation without revealing details on the investigation.  
Member States that are not yet using the FIDE database are invited to do so in order to better 
coordinate their investigations. 
4.  RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE REGARDING COOPERATION WITH THE MEMBER 
STATES CONCERNING ON-THE-SPOT CHECKS 
On-the-spot checks and inspections are one of the most powerful tools available to the 
Commission to conduct administrative investigations outside the EU institutions and bodies 
with a view to achieving the objective of combating fraud and other illegal activity 
undermining the EU’s financial interests. An on-the-spot check is an inspection carried out on 
the premises of an economic operator. The power to conduct such checks was conferred on 
the Commission by Regulation 2185/1996
35. The responsibility was then confirmed by the EU 
legislator with the establishment of OLAF, which exercises the powers conferred on the 
Commission under Regulation 2185/1996
36.  
The implementation of this Regulation is based on close two-way cooperation between OLAF 
and the competent national authorities
37. The participation of Member States’ investigative 
authorities is desirable because it facilitates and increases the effectiveness of checks and 
inspections, in particular in the event of opposition by economic operators, when binding 
measures of national law and possible emergency procedures may be applied. Cooperation is 
vital, starting with the pre-operational phase of the inspection, when the competent national 
authority has to be notified by OLAF of the object, purpose and legal basis of the check that 
OLAF intends to conduct. For that, OLAF needs to correctly identify the competent national 
authority and this has at times proved challenging, particularly in the field of direct 
expenditure.  
To solve this problem Member States have communicated to OLAF — via a questionnaire — 
the complete contact details of national authorities for all expenditure fields, including direct 
expenditure
38, thus enabling the OLAF investigators to identify and contact the competent 
authority in good time before the check. OLAF will remain in close contact with the Member 
States for the continuous updating of this information.  
The designation of a national administrative and judicial authority with competences extended 
to the field of direct expenditure in all Member States is strongly recommended. 
                                                 
35  Regulation 2185/1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in 
order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ 
L 292, 15.11.1996). 
36  Pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulations 1073/1999 and 1074/1999 concerning investigations conducted 
by the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF). 
37  See Article 4 of Regulation 2185/1996. 
38  Not all Member States have designated a central authority dealing with direct expenditure, but most of 
them have reported that they have an investigative service responsible for this field, with the exception 
of Germany, Spain and the UK.  
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Following the preparatory steps for the inspection, effective involvement of the national 
competent authorities on the ground and assistance to the OLAF investigators in the event of 
opposition by the economic operator are essential in order to ensure the success of the 
inspection. During the conduct of an on-the-spot check and in as much as EU law does not 
provide specific rules, OLAF inspectors are required to comply with the rules of procedure 
laid down by the law of the Member State concerned. It is therefore important for the 
Commission to better understand the national laws and practices and administrative 
procedures in conducting these checks and for this purpose Member States have provided 
information on these topics via a questionnaire. The complete answers provided by the 
Member States to the questionnaire are included in the staff working document
39 
accompanying this report and represent useful background information regarding the national 
requirements and practices for the OLAF investigators when preparing on-the-spot checks in 
the Member States. 
4.1.  National conditions for gaining access to information 
Under Article 7 of Regulation 2185/1996, Commission inspectors have access to all 
information and documentation on the operations concerned under the same conditions as 
national administrative inspectors. All Member States have reported that national legislation 
grants inspectors full access to information and documentation available on the operation 
concerned. In cases where the operator is the beneficiary of an EU grant, the obligation to 
provide access to documentation and information is inserted as an obligation in the grant 
contract
40 and thus constitutes an important precautionary measure. Particular conditions 
apply to enforcement measures such as searching or seizures, where a judicial warrant issued 
by a law-enforcement agency is necessary
41. As a general rule, national inspectors also have 
access to information located elsewhere than on the economic operator’s premises and they 
may check such premises; however, checks in private residences are not possible without a 
judicial warrant, in line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
constitutional provisions
42 regarding fundamental rights and freedoms. Where applicable in 
certain Member States
43, the main legal limitations in obtaining the information relevant to 
on-the-spot checks from documents, electronic resources or interviews mentioned were data 
protection requirements, banking secrecy rules and professional secrecy rules.  
In order to safeguard the chain of custody and continuity of possession over the records 
selected during the on-the-spot checks, national inspectors may make copies of records (either 
on paper or electronic records), and items can be photographed and filmed. In many Member 
States, inspectors have the authority to seize and detain original documents pertaining to the 
scope of the control, in justified cases, where there is a risk that evidence may be hidden or 
destroyed or because it is necessary to retain the originals for further examination
44.  
In general, the presence of a lawyer during administrative on-the-spot checks is not provided 
for by national legislation. Therefore, national provisions do not allow the operator concerned 
by the check to delay access to information until he consults his lawyer. However, most 
                                                 
39  See Accompanying document 1 ‘Implementation of Article 325 TFEU in 2009 by the Member States'. 
40 LT,UK,  AT. 
41 DE,  LU. 
42  As especially highlighted by DE. 
43  BE, CZ, DE, EE, IE, EL, IT, CY, HU, PL, RO, SK, SE, UK. 
44  BE, IE, EL, FR, CY, HU, MT, AT, PT, RO, LU, SI, SK, FI, UK.  
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national legislations
45 recognise the lawyer-client privilege to be applicable to administrative 
checks, under conditions which vary from one Member State to another
46. In all Member 
States national inspectors have access to information and documentation pertaining to the on-
the-spot check and they may retain original documents or take copies of the originals. Certain 
limitations are imposed by the necessity of a warrant for searches and seizures.  
Regarding the forensic examination of computers, OLAF has recently designed a leaflet for 
the information of economic operators. This document advises economic operators on their 
rights and details the procedure for the forensic examination of computers during OLAF’s on-
the-spot checks. The leaflet is of particular relevance in Member States which do not have 
specific legislative provisions with regard to this procedure.  
As a general rule, whenever the economic operator subject to an on-the-spot check is the 
beneficiary of a EU grant, the grant contract should include the obligation of the economic 
operator to give access to information to OLAF inspectors in order to facilitate the check. 
4.2.  National procedural requirements for on-the-spot checks and for drawing up 
administrative inspection reports 
Article 6(1) of Regulation 2185/1996 requires the Commission inspectors to comply, during 
on-the-spot checks, with the rules of procedure laid down by the law of the Member State 
concerned. Member States have indicated that these procedures are usually provided by 
manuals and instructions to the national inspectors. Among these procedural requirements, 
Member States have mentioned: non-notification of checks except where necessary, 
restrictions on access to private residences (see above), observance of the law on the use of 
languages
47. Inspectors should produce a written authorisation or inspection order and special 
identification card
48; the check should take place in the presence of the economic operator 
concerned
49 and during certain hours, depending on national legislation
50. An inspection 
report must be drafted and, in certain cases, a final discussion with the liable party should take 
place before the report is drawn up
51. Certain procedural requirements apply to the national 
administrative reports: in most Member States, national inspectors use a standard template 
and the content usually describes the irregularities noted, the legal provisions infringed and 
the results of the check. The report must be signed in all cases by the national inspectors 
conducting the check and in some cases by the economic operator. If the economic operator 
refuses to sign, this will be mentioned in the report. The report is usually approved by the 
hierarchical superior of the inspector in charge of the check. In general, Member States have 
indicated that there are no restrictions regarding the admissibility of administrative inspection 
reports in administrative or judicial proceedings. Exceptions included situations where 
irregularities have been committed while collecting the information contained in the report
52 
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and where national law provides that evidence obtained during administrative procedures 
cannot be used in criminal proceedings
53. 
In order to be admissible in administrative or judicial proceedings, national administrative 
reports drafted following an on-the-spot check must likewise meet certain requirements, 
including signature by the national inspectors. It has been OLAF’s experience that the 
signature of the report by the national inspector has on occasion been delayed or refused 
without giving specific reasons during joint inspections.  
It is therefore essential that the national inspector participating in an OLAF on-the-spot check 
also signs the OLAF report without undue delay, thus avoiding the risk of it being non-
admissible or having lower evidentiary value in administrative or judicial proceedings.  
4.3.  Assistance of national authorities in the event of opposition by economic 
operators 
Assistance by the national authorities is important and it is not conditional on the national 
authority’s participation in the check. The need for the support of national authorities 
becomes even more pressing in cases where the economic operator opposes the check by the 
Commission inspectors. The assistance and support of the national authorities is extremely 
important regardless of the type of EU expenditure concerned (direct expenditure or shared 
management of EU funds). The same kind of support, particularly for the safeguarding of 
evidence, must be made available when checks regarding direct expenditure are conducted, in 
order to ensure the same level of protection of EU funds for all expenditure areas.  
In cases where the economic operator opposes the check, certain Member States
54 indicated 
that the Commission inspectors may enter the premises of the economic operator concerned 
even without his prior consent during an on-the-spot check. In cases where there is opposition 
by an economic operator hampering the check, Member States’ competent authorities may 
assist Commission inspectors by issuing a judicial or administrative warrant
55, or assist them 
if necessary — with reasonable force — to access the premises of the economic operator. In 
such cases of opposition by the economic operator, police or national inspectors may 
intervene and assist the Commission inspectors
56. Other measures that Member States may 
take include suspending or terminating payments in the case of beneficiaries of EU grants or 
applying fines. In the event that the operator concerned refuses to grant access to information, 
the inspectors may seal the premises
57 and take and retain in their custody both books and 
other paper or electronic records, with a judicial or administrative warrant
58. They may apply 
a formal interrogation procedure to the representatives of the economic operator
59. Criminal 
sanctions such as fines or suspension of payments to the beneficiary of EU grants may be 
applied when the economic operator refuses to grant access to information. 
Member States have adopted binding measures in their national law to ensure that OLAF 
investigators conducting on-the-spot checks can benefit from the assistance of the national 
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competent authorities in cases where the economic operator opposes the check. Some of these 
measures, such as issuing a judicial or administrative mandate, seizures of documents or 
interrogation procedures, give immediate results and should be favoured by national 
legislation.  
The active participation of national authorities on the ground can contribute greatly to the 
success of the operation. Therefore, national inspectors should be actively involved in the 
inspection, rather than participating as simple observers, which some national authorities 
chose in some OLAF cases as declared status during on-the-spot checks. The same level of 
assistance to OLAF inspectors should be ensured for shared management as for direct 
expenditure. 
4.4.  National precautionary measures to prevent loss or destruction of evidence 
Emergency measures such as sealing business premises and photographing or filming 
installations, circuits and other objects are allowed by most national legislations. Sometimes 
these measures can be taken only in the context of a judicial procedure
60. Other precautionary 
measures include taking samples, with judicial authorisation, seizing documents or seeking 
police assistance when needed. These measures may be taken in situations where there is a 
threat of disappearance, concealment or modification of documents or where there are 
suspicions that a crime has been committed
61. The reasons for taking such measures must be 
recorded. In most Member States there is a possibility of appeal against such measures. 
4.5.  General conclusions 
Following this exercise it may be concluded that Member States have taken a number of 
measures to consolidate the implementation of Regulation 2185/1996; however, in practice, 
some improvements can still be made in that area, including in cooperation between OLAF 
and the national authorities, as outlined above. 
The Commission will continue to monitor the implementation of these recommendations in 
future reports. 
5.  RECOVERY 
5.1.  Measures for securing the recovery of irregular amounts 
Member States were asked about their national provisions on the recovery of irregular 
amounts, with a focus on legal instruments and measures against financial loss or damage, 
and about the registration of irregularities and recovery of debts. In its Resolution of 24 April 
2009 on the protection of the Communities’ financial interests and the fight against fraud — 
Annual report 2007 (2008/2242(INI)) the European Parliament noted that recovery rates are 
still low, especially in sectors where Member States manage recoveries. The European 
Parliament considered that more appropriate and faster recovery procedures were needed and 
binding and precautionary elements should be included in future legislation concerning shared 
management so that irregular amounts can be recovered at the end of the recovery procedure. 
This way, the recovery of taxpayers’ money could be more efficiently secured. 
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5.1.1.  National legislation on recovery of EU funds 
Member States’ replies show that all Member States have provisions within their national 
legislation for securing the recovery of irregular amounts as regards the revenue and 
expenditure side of the EU budget in areas where no rules on recovery are laid down by EU 
legislation. The provisions relate to mechanisms of offsetting, precautionary enforcement, 
seizure and forced recovery. 
Regarding expenditure, to secure the recovery of irregular payments included in contracts 
involving EU funds, most Member States
62 use legal instruments, such as different types of 
guarantees, promissory notes, security deposits, personal or joint sureties, offsetting, bank 
bonds, mortgages or insurances. 
Two thirds of the Member States
63 are using legal instruments and measures, such as on-
demand guarantees, offsetting and suspension of payments, in order to speed up the recovery 
of amounts irregularly paid. 
The national legislation of most of the Member States
64 contains provisions on protective and 
precautionary measures that can be taken after the detection of suspected irregular amounts 
(revenue and expenditure). Such measures are: confiscation, administrative seizure, retention 
of goods subject to tax, financial penalties, suspension, refusal or adjustments of further 
payments, termination of the project financing and repayment of the funds paid, reduced 
funding.  
Member States’ national legislation provides the possibility (not specifically an obligation) for 
the national administration to stand as offended/injured party in criminal proceedings for 
frauds against the EU budget.  
5.1.2.  Registration of irregularities and recovery of debts within the national 
administration 
Although individual errors cannot be categorically ruled out, according to the information 
received via the questionnaire, the Member States can in principle guarantee the completeness 
of the registration of irregularities. 
In all Member States the recovery figures are audited on a national level after the recoveries 
are completed. Checks and audits are primarily made by various national authorities, such as 
internal audit services of the respective institutions (managing authority, certifying authority, 
intermediate bodies, implementing bodies), customs authorities and national audit office. 
As regards EU revenues and expenditure, two thirds of the Member States
65 have at national 
level a legally regulated threshold under which there is no recovery order. This threshold 
varies from € 3 to € 100, sometimes not being uniform within the same country for all the 
funds used or areas concerned (agriculture, structural funds, and customs). 
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In some of the Member States
66 the recovery order is not enforceable. 
Only a few Member States
67 would to a certain extent use the revenues forecast as a method 
for making a preliminary estimate of a potential irregularity amount to be recovered before 
the recovery actually starts. When doing so, the estimates would normally be provided within 
the monitoring and accounting systems used for the management of EU funds.  
5.1.3.  Conclusions 
As regards the recovery of illegal amounts the legal instruments and measures against 
financial loss or damage and concerning the registration of irregularities and recovery of debts 
are as a matter of principle incorporated within the national legislative systems. This way the 
Member States show that security measures are in place, but certain improvements can still be 
made.  
Member States’ legislation should give priority to the enforceability of recovery orders, which 
has an important role in speeding up recovery procedures. To secure the recovery of irregular 
payments included in contracts involving EU funds, all Member States should provide for 
legal instruments, such as different types of guarantees, promissory notes, security deposits, 
personal or joint sureties, offsetting, bank bonds, mortgages or insurances, in the contracts.  
To support speedy recovery procedures additional binding and precautionary elements should 
be considered for future EU legislation concerning shared management. 
5.2.  Recovery of irregular amounts in 2009 
5.2.1.  Traditional own resources 
The Member States have to recover established amounts, including those they register in the 
shared database OWNRES. The amount to be recovered following irregularities detected in 
2009 is approximately € 343 million.  
An established amount may not be recovered completely, despite Member States’ efforts. 
Amounts established may change because of additional information or judicial procedures, or 
the debt may be deemed irrecoverable because of the debtor’s financial problems. 
At present, the recovery rate for irregularities occurring in 2009 is 44 % (approximately 
€ 152 million). This is an average starting position, although higher than last year’s of 38 %. 
The recovery rate for all years (1989-2009) is 45.1 %. 
When non-recovery of an established debt is not attributable to a Member State, the Member 
State may request that the irrecoverable amount be written off. In 2009 the Commission 
refused Member States’ write-off requests in 61 cases totalling some € 11.5 million because it 
deemed that non-recovery was attributable to the Member States. 
Moreover, certain Member States were held financially responsible for a total of more than 
€ 9 million because they did not establish customs debts where they should have done so. 
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5.2.2.  Agriculture 
Article 32 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 provides for an automatic clearance 
mechanism for unsuccessful recoveries of unduly paid amounts. If a Member State fails to 
recover an unduly paid amount from the beneficiary within four years of the primary 
administrative or judicial finding (or, in the case of proceedings before national courts, within 
eight years), 50 % of the non-recovered amount is charged to the budget of the Member State 
concerned within the framework of the annual financial clearance of the EAGF and EAFRD 
accounts. Even after the application of this mechanism, Member States are required to pursue 
their recovery procedures and to credit 50 % of the amounts effectively recovered to the EU 
budget. If they fail to do so with the necessary diligence, the Commission may decide to 
charge the entire outstanding amounts to the Member State concerned. 
Undue payments that are the result of administrative errors committed by the national 
authorities have to be deducted from the annual accounts of the paying agencies concerned 
and, thus, excluded from EU financing. 
In the year 2009, the 50/50 mechanism was applied by the financial clearance decision for the 
financial year 2008
68 to all pending non-recovered cases dating from 2004 or 2000 (cases that 
were four or eight years old respectively). A total of € 31.4  million was charged to the 
Member States in this way and € 20.1 million was borne by the EU budget for reasons of 
irrecoverability. A further € 0.8 million was charged to the Member States by a subsequent 
decision
69 that cleared the accounts for financial year 2008 of those paying agencies that were 
disjoined in April 2009. 
During the financial year 2009 Member States recovered € 167.3 million and the outstanding 
amount still to be recovered from the beneficiaries at the end of that financial year was 
€ 1 136.2 million. 
The financial consequences of non-recovery for cases dating from 2005 or 2001 was 
determined in accordance with the 50/50 rule mentioned above by charging € 22.8 million to 
the Member States concerned
70. Moreover, € 20.3 million was borne by the EU budget for 
cases reported irrecoverable during financial year 2009. For those paying agencies for which 
the 2009 accounts were disjoined from the financial clearance decision, a further 
€ 11.9 million will be charged by subsequent Commission decisions. 
Due the application of the 50/50 mechanism since its introduction in 2006 the amount 
outstanding from the Member States towards the EU budget has been reduced to 
€ 830 million
71. 
During the years 2007-09 the Commission audited the correct application of the new 
clearance mechanism through 15 on-the-spot checks covering 14 paying agencies in 11 
Member States.  
                                                 
68  Commission Decision 2009/367/EC (OJ L 111, 5.5.2009). 
69  Commission Decision 2010/56/EU (OJ L 32, 4.2.2010). 
70  Commission Decision 2010/258/EU (OJ L 112, 5.5.2010). 
71  The amount includes updated financial information provided by the Member States for the financial 
year 2009.  
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In general the Member States’ authorities have adequate procedures in place to protect the 
financial interests of the European Union. Deficiencies found during these on-the-spot checks 
are being followed up in the context of conformity clearance procedures. 
5.2.3.  Cohesion policy 
For the Structural Funds, recovery from the beneficiaries of amounts unduly paid owing to 
irregularity or suspected fraud is mainly a matter for the Member States. Member States must 
also deduct from a future payment claim any amount which was previously unduly claimed 
from the EU budget.  
The programmes co-financed by the Structural Funds are multiannual and based on interim 
payments. Recovery of amounts unduly paid may take place before or after conclusion of the 
programme.  
For the 1994-99 programming period, the deadline for requesting final payment from the 
Commission was 31  March 2003. In that period, the EU co-financed around 1 000 
programmes worth some € 159 billion in total
72. The Commission’s authorising and managing 
departments, assisted by OLAF, are responsible for administrative and financial follow-up 
once these programmes have been concluded.  
For the 1994-99 programming period, the Member States communicated 11 046 cases  of 
irregularities (21 in 2009) with a financial impact estimated at € 1.51 billion
73 for the EU 
contribution (€ 1.84 million for 2009). 
Of these cases, 7 049 have been closed definitively at Commission level and an amount of 
€ 742 million was taken into account during final payment or decommitted after closure or 
reimbursed to the EU budget. Member States indicated that administrative and judicial 
procedures had been finalised at national level in a further 566 cases, with a financial impact 
of € 52 million for the same period. The Commission has started reconciliation procedures 
with a view to closing these cases. 
In 2009, the Commission adopted seven decisions on how to treat 241 cases of irregularities 
for which the Member States concerned asked the Commission to bear the financial 
consequences of the irrecoverable amounts. Three decisions concerning 217 ERDF 
notifications totalling €1 773 541 and four decisions concerning the ESF for a total of 
€130 785 were charged to the EU budget. 
For the 2000-06 programming period, the Member States have so far communicated 20 991 
cases of irregularities (4 679 in 2009) with a financial impact of some € 3.49 billion for the EU 
contribution (€ 1.12 billion for 2009).  
The Member States have informed the Commission that administrative and/or judicial 
procedures have been finalised at national level for 10 655 of these cases and that some 
€ 1.73 billion has been recovered. 
                                                 
72  These are multiannual programmes. This figure does not include projects directly financed under the 
Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund. 
73  Situation according to the data in the ECR database as at 15 April 2009.  
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Recovery rates throughout the 2000-06 programming period are good (exceeding 50 % — 
almost as good as for the 1994-99 programming period, which is 53 %) but may be heavily 
influenced by the practice of excluding projects found to be irregular from the expenditure 
declaration to the Commission. In this way EU resources can be re-used to finance other 
eligible projects and the burden of recovery is shifted onto national budgets.  
Member States should deploy further efforts for the recovery of irregular amounts.  
At the end of 2009, the total amount of financial corrections concerning the 1994-99 and 
2000-06 programming periods was € 2 510 million (€ 515 million in 2009) and € 5 119 million 
(€ 1 806 million in 2009) respectively. These are the result of audits by the Commission and 
the European Court of Auditors, OLAF investigations and the closure procedure for the two 
programming periods. They consist of expenditure affected by irregularities which, for that 
reason, must be excluded from co-financing by the EU budget. On top of that, the Member 
States also effect corrections following their own audits or Commission and European Court 
of Auditors audits. These are not registered in the Commission’s accounting system, but the 
information is reported by the Member States to the Commission once a year.  
5.2.4.  Pre-accession funds 
In 2009 amounts reported as to be recovered increased by 135 %. The highest amount to be 
recovered comes from SAPARD (€  61.6 million, out of which €  41 million has to be 
recovered by Bulgaria). For PHARE almost € 7 million needs to be recovered and for ISPA 
€ 4 million. The recovery rate decreased in comparison to 2008, reaching only 27.2 % in 
2009.  
Analysis of the recovery rate for suspected fraud reveals a rate of only 4.6 % for the whole 
programming period. The recovery process in cases undergoing prosecution is complex and 
lengthy. Administrative procedures and criminal investigation do not go hand-in-hand in most 
countries, a fact which influences recovery rates.  
As recovery rates are low, safeguard measures should be implemented for suspected fraud 
cases (in the form of seizure of assets, suspension of payments, bank guarantees, etc. — see 
point 5.1.3. above) to make sure that recovery can still take place after the final court ruling. 
The Member States concerned should pay special attention to the recovery of pre-accession 
funds. 
5.2.5.  Direct expenditure  
In the areas where funds are managed directly by the institutions, amounts unduly paid are 
recovered directly by them, without the intervention of the Member States. The Financial 
Regulation and its implementing rules set out the different stages in the recovery procedure: 
– estimation and establishment of the entitlement by the authorising officer (who must ensure 
that the claim is certain, of a fixed amount and due); 
– establishment of a recovery order (instruction from the authorising officer to the accounting 
officer to proceed with recovery) followed by a debit note to the debtor; and 
– recovery by the accounting officer, who will, if possible, effect the recovery by offsetting if 
the debtor has a claim on the Communities that is certain, of a fixed amount and due.  
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If, after reminders and letters of formal notice have been sent out, the debtor has not paid the 
debt and the accounting officer has not been able to recover the amount due by offsetting or 
calling in a bank guarantee provided by the debtor, the authorising officer determines, without 
delay, what method of enforced recovery should be applied to the debt. 
There are two mutually exclusive ways of obtaining an enforcement order: 
– a decision constituting an enforcement order within the meaning of Article 256 of the EC 
Treaty (formalises the establishment of the entitlement in a decision which constitutes an 
enforcement order); 
– an order before the national or EU courts. This also includes a civil action within criminal 
proceedings in jurisdictions where this is possible. 
In cases where recovery orders concerning irregularities and cases of fraud were launched 
during 2009, full or partial recovery has already been announced in 478 reported cases. The 
Commission has recovered € 15.5 million. In 463 cases the full irregular amount has been 
recovered. An amount of € 12 million still remains to be recovered, concerning 242 cases. 
The Commission will continue procedures for the full recovery of these amounts. 
5.2.6.  Recovery following an OLAF case 
Where the final report on an OLAF case concludes that certain amounts have probably been 
paid to a beneficiary against the rules or that amounts that should have been collected have 
not been, the relevant authorities (generally the authorities in the Member States or third 
countries concerned) must recover the amounts in question. OLAF monitors the course of 
these recovery proceedings.  
In 2009, OLAF formally closed the financial follow-up procedure for more than €  249.2 
million. In total € 137.2 million was recovered in the agricultural sector and € 49.1 million in 
the field of structural funds.  
OLAF will continue to work together with the authorising Directorates-General within the 
Commission responsible for the budget sectors concerned to further improve recovery 
following OLAF cases.  
 